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cent evaluation findings and draws some conclusions for the future setup of active 
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1. Reform as a Process 
 
The growing unemployment rate in Germany has led to a large number of instru-
mental regulations, which have complicated rather than simplified employment pol-
icy. Depending on the type of classification, anywhere from 60 to 80 instruments of 
labor market policy can be identified. One of the more commendable merits of the 
Hartz reforms has been the proposals to curtail the uncontrolled growth of active 
labor market policy schemes. While these reforms have also led to the introduction of 
many new instruments, which have now been proven to be ineffective, they have 
been able to enforce a thorough evaluation of the labor market programs—something 
the academic community has called for. 
 
Measures that seem plausible at first, and are actively—and expensively—embraced 
by the affected parties, may in the end be totally ineffective in terms of labor policy. 
The inefficacy of potentially effective instruments may be due to insufficient accep-
tance or to poorly-designed organization and implementation. A single reason for the 
failures is, therefore, hard to be identified. A combination of trial and error and of 
evaluation and innovation has the potential to generate greater success in employ-
ment policy. 
 
This paper documents the structural changes and improvements of labor market pol-
icy over the last several years, and also provides a comprehensive assessment of the 
current Hartz evaluations. The result is that the number of instruments of labor mar-
ket policy can be reduced to four. 
 
2. Structural Change of Active Labor Market Policy in Germany 
 
The Hartz reforms fundamentally changed the structure of active labor market policy 
in Germany. On the one hand, this meant considerable modifications to the instru-
ments in the German Social Code (SGB) III by the first three Hartz acts, namely to the 
labor market programs for recipients of Unemployment Benefits I [Arbeitslosengeld I] 
and the now-abolished Unemployment Assistance [Arbeitslosenhilfe]. On the other 
hand, the structural reforms resulted in integration measures for jobseekers who are 
not entitled to Unemployment Benefits I and, consequently, receive basic support 
under the Arbeitslosengeld II act. Note that Arbeitslosengeld II was completely restruc-
tured by Hartz IV in 2005. In contrast to pre-reform labor market policy, the princi-
ples of effectiveness and efficiency were clearly stressed in the redesigning of the in-
struments and restructuring of the Federal Employment Agency’s placement activi-
ties by making increased use of private service providers.  
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The goals of active labor market policy are, according to Social Code III, higher em-
ployment rates, improvement of the employment structure, prevention of long-term 
unemployment and reduction of the duration of unemployment. Integration into the 
labor market is a central criterion of success in this respect. In terms of Social Code II 
(i.e. the code targeting the long-term unemployed and those in need of aid), the focus 
is on ending their need for assistance. Its implementation is geared towards reenter-
ing the labor market and, if necessary, making the recipient fit for employment. For 
the disabled, who are also mentioned in Social Code III, the aim is participation in 
working life and ensuring employability. Integration into the labor market can, there-
fore, be seen as the main task of labor market policy, as well as its most important, 
yet not the only, measure of success. 
 
Table 1 illustrates the development of expenditures for active labor market policy 
before and after the Hartz reforms. It provides an overview of total expenditures for 
the integration measures in Social Code III and—since 2005—in Social Code II. Com-
pared to 2002, spending on active labor market policy through 2006 has decreased 
from €22.1 billion to approximately €15 billion—a reduction of about one-third. Dis-
regarding transfer payments to avoid unemployment, around €20.5 billion were 
spent on active labor market policy in 2002 and €13.1 billion in 2006. Training pro-
grams were the most important instrument in 2002. Through 2006, however, their 
financial volume decreased from €7.2 to €2.0 billion. Other important expenditure 
items were youth programs (€3.2 billion in 2002 and €1.8 billion in 2006) as well as 
programs for the disabled (€3.1 billion in 2002 and €2.6 billion in 2006). Support of 
dependent employment in the form of wage subsidies to employers also declined 
during this period, decreasing from €1.8 billion to just less than one billion. The same 
can be said of the so-called direct job-creation schemes, for which spending was re-
duced from €3.2 to €2.0 billion. At the same time, classical job-creation schemes have 
been effectively replaced by Social Code II employment opportunities. In contrast, 
the sponsoring of self-employment has been increased from around €1 billion in 2002 
to €2.6 billion in 2006. Partial retirement also became more widespread during this 
period, accounting for an increase from €670 million to €1.3 billion.  
 
 
TABLE 1 about here  
 
 
Table 2 shows the annual average number of participants in important labor market 
programs between 2000 and 2006. Where data on the actual number of participants 
are not available, the yearly figures are given for both the cumulative number of en-
trants and authorizations to participate in a measure. This pertains to mobility grants, 
placement vouchers and the financial support of counseling and placement. 
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These statistics on the annual average number of participants show a relative conti-
nuity over recent years. A significant intensification of placement and counseling is 
just as noteworthy as the utilization of external service providers and the decrease in 
the number of participants in training programs. There was, however, a notable ex-
pansion of shorter training schemes and aptitude tests, as well as of measures aimed 
at younger workers in the framework of the special initiative "Jump," and the regular 
support under Social Code III. The promotion of dependent employment via wage 
subsidies has lost importance, though, while an expansion of the promotion of self-
employment could be recorded. The newer instruments for the promotion of the em-
ployment of older people and temporary work agencies for the unemployed made no 
significant impact. As of 2005, public employment opportunities in Social Code II 
("one-euro jobs") have largely replaced job-creation schemes and similar instruments. 
 
 
TABLE 2 about here  
 
 
While the number of participants and amount spent on these programs reflects a dis-
tancing trend from public job-creation and training programs, the number of “one-
euro jobs” has been increasing. Meanwhile the volume of promoted dependent em-
ployment has decreased and the sponsoring of business start-ups has expanded. 
With the exception of “Me, Inc.,” [Ich-AG]  a government-funded program to help 
the unemployed start their own businesses, the instruments newly created by the 
first Hartz acts have not been able to make a greater impact.  
 
 
3. On the Evaluation of Active Labor Market Policy Programs 
 
3.1 Demands on the Method 
 
This evaluation is meant to establish at the individual level whether participation in 
an active labor market policy measure increases the likelihood of employment, short-
ens the duration of unemployment or positively affects any other target value. In or-
der to identify the causal effects of participation in a program, the following question 
arises: What would have happened to the individual had he/she not participated in 
the program? It is, however, impossible to simultaneously observe an individual in 
the states of participation and non-participation. Therefore, every evaluation is faced 
with the challenge to overcome this contradictory requirement. There are generally 
two approaches that allow for a systematic evaluation of the effects of active labor 
market policy (Hujer/Caliendo 2000, Schmidt et al. 2001): the selection of a real or an 
artificial control group. 
 
By their very nature, experiments present a control group and a simple procedure to 
solve the evaluation problem. Here, individuals who are principally eligible to par-
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ticipate in the relevant program are randomly selected for either the group of partici-
pants or the control group, thus avoiding any systematic differences between the 
groups in terms of observable or unobservable characteristics. The participation ef-
fect can then be identified by a simple comparison of the average values for the ob-
served target values of both groups. Note that such assignments are often politically 
impractical or cannot be conducted. 
 
Alternatively, an artificial control group can be generated. In this case, however, the 
allocation of participation and non-participation in an active labor market policy 
measure is not random. A method that aims at simulating an experiment ex post is 
used. In this context, the so-called matching method is generally used in order to 
construct two groups with the most similar participants and non-participants possi-
ble. This procedure ensures that the group of participants and the control group ac-
cording to their observable characteristics exhibit similar probabilities of program 
participation. Again, the participation effect can be uncovered through a comparison 
of both groups’ average target values. 
 
If the methods described for the evaluation of a measure are not applied, no com-
parative assessment concerning the effectiveness of participation and non-
participation can be made. Indicating, for instance, how many participants found 
employment after the measure does not allow for any conclusions regarding the 
causal effect of participation, since the counterfactual question cannot be answered 
without the comparison to an adequate control group. Gross integration rates, which 
are still used in practice in the field of labor market policy, are no basis to judge suc-
cess. 
 
In order to ensure that active labor market policy measures not only positively influ-
ence the observed target values on a partial, individual level, additional assessments 
of the national economic effects are also necessary. Here, the focus is on whether 
measures of labor market policy lead to the displacement of companies without sup-
ported persons (crowding-out effects), to the replacement of unsupported by sup-
ported workers within a company (substitution effects) or to the subsidization of hir-
ings that would have taken place anyway (deadweight loss). Apart from that, reper-
cussions of labor market policy on non-participants must be examined as those 
measures are financed by taxes and contributions, consequently placing a burden on 
non-participants. In the end, the net effect of labor market policy on the national 
economy can only be found through an analysis of the entire national economy. 
 
3.2 Evaluation before Hartz: Vagueness and Skepticism 
 
Before the Hartz reforms, only a couple of “classical” labor market policy instru-
ments (e.g. job-creation schemes, further training or wage subsidies) were examined 
by sound micro-econometric evaluations, and they were, in part, significantly 
changed by the reforms. The studies were usually based on smaller data sets such as 
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the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) or the Labor Market Monitor East Germany (Ar-
beitsmarktmonitor Ost), both of which have too few observations to allow for more 
detailed analyses of heterogeneous measures. These earlier evaluations, as well as 
younger analyses which were conducted on the basis of administrative data before 
the Hartz reforms (cf. for an overview Fitzenberger/Speckesser 2000, Fitzenber-
ger/Hujer 2002, Hujer/Caliendo 2000, Schmidt et al. 2001, Caliendo/Steiner 2005), on 
the whole, show rather unclear or critical effects on the participants’ employment 
opportunities. 
 
In terms of further training, an ambiguous pattern between individual types of 
measures and contradictory findings emerged. Effects that were partially positive in 
the long run were coupled with strong lock-in effects (i.e., a lower employment prob-
ability during participation in a measure). Altogether, the employment effect of in-
centive measures relevant to further training had to be assessed with an amount of 
skepticism. Despite a particular heterogeneity with regard to the findings, negative 
results prevailed concerning the effects of job-creation schemes and the associated 
instruments such as structural adjustment measures (SAM). With regard to wage 
subsidies, evidence could be found that suggested a reduced duration of unemploy-
ment. With regard to promoting business start-ups through the payment of bridging 
allowances, though, no advantages could be found over individuals who did not re-
ceive assistance.  
 
At the same time, there was no evidence that supports the effectiveness of special 
labor market programs like the Program for the Immediate Reduction of Youth Un-
employment (Jump), whose evaluation (Dietrich 2001) drew no comparison to non-
participants. Furthermore, no unemployment effects could be verified for the initia-
tive CAST/Mainz Model (Kaltenborn et al. 2005).  
 
3.3 Evaluation after Hartz: A More Intuitive Organization of the Measures 
 
The scientific analysis of the German active labor market policy was further devel-
oped and enhanced by the systematic evaluation of the Hartz reforms. The evalua-
tion of the first three Hartz acts comprises the instruments which were kept and par-
tially modified after the reforms. Evaluation reports on the instruments introduced 
by the Hartz reforms, such as temporary work agencies for the unemployed, start-up 
grants (Me, Inc.), or the measures to promote the employment of older people, have 
been presented. There are still, however, no findings concerning the measures under 
Social Code II (i.e., Hartz IV), such as the “one-euro jobs” or the job-entry-grant. Al-
together, more robust results can now be generated, thanks to the availability of a 
wider data base rooted in administrative data as well as the application of more suit-
able methods. The available observation period of the evaluation initiated by the 
government itself, however, was too short to assess the long-term effects so far. 
 
  5 
In detail, the following findings concerning the integration effects of the individual 
instruments result from the final reports on Hartz I through III (Bundesregierung 
2006, Kaltenborn/Knerr/Schiwarov 2006, Jacobi/Kluve 2006):1
 
 
1.  Counseling and placement by the Federal Labor Agency were intensified in 
the course of the reform. Of the newly-introduced services to support place-
ment by including private service providers (i.e., the placement voucher, 
commissioning third parties to place workers and commissioning providers of 
integration measures), only the placement voucher exhibited positive effects in 
terms of an accelerated integration of unemployed voucher holders in com-
parison to similarly unemployed persons without holding such a voucher. No 
effects could be verified for commissioning third parties to place workers or to 
conduct integration measures (WZB/Infas 2006). 
 
2.  For the qualification programs (i.e., sponsored further training), evidence of 
positive effects had already been uncovered by several studies prior to the re-
forms, even though this pattern was inconsistent. The evaluation of reformed 
further training in connection with the training voucher yielded clearer evi-
dence to support a positive effect on the employment opportunities of partici-
pants and, moreover, showed an improvement of effectiveness in comparison 
to the situation before the reforms, which may be attributed to the rise in the 
quality of training measures and the reduction of their duration. The so-called 
lock-in effect during participation decreased significantly (IZA/DIW/Infas 
2006, Schneider 2006).2  
 
3.  For wage subsidies to promote dependent employment of older workers, only 
slight positive effects could be observed, which were limited to women in East 
Germany. Otherwise, a significant deadweight loss was observed. Other kinds 
of wage subsidies cause an accelerated transition into non-promoted employ-
ment, but they are also subject to substantial deadweight loss. The reforms as 
such have not brought about any improvement here. Other newly-created 
measures to promote the employment of older people, such as the social secu-
rity contribution bonus for employers and the remuneration guarantee (as 
well as the facilitated use of fixed-term contracts) did not show any effects on 
                                                 
1 Most of these findings are confirmed by first results from systematic program evaluation within the 
PES, i.e., the so-called “TrEffeR” project (Stefan/Rässler/Schewe 2006). 
2 Positive effects on an earlier transition to employment are present for four of the six investigated 
types of measures, while no clear improvement could yet be determined concerning individual and 
group measures with a recognized vocational qualification due to the short observation period. Posi-
tive effects on the transition into employment are also observable in a certain timeframe after com-
mencement if participants in the measures of the ESF-BA-program in the field of promoted further 
training, which is complementary to the regular instruments, are compared to non-participants 
(Kruppe 2006).  
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the integration of older workers into the labor market (Ammermüller et al. 
2006, Boockmann et al. 2007, ZEW/IAB/IAT 2005). 
 
4.  Regarding the promotion of self-employment through bridging allowances   
(Business Start-Up Grant I) and “Me, Inc.” (Business Start-Up Grant II), the 
studies show that the supported individuals were more often self-employed or 
in dependent employment than unemployed (Caliendo/Steiner 2007, IAB et al. 
2006). However, a greater share of the individuals who received support 
through “Me, Inc.” was still operating in the phase of subsidization. Conse-
quently, only a preliminary estimation of the effects was possible. There are 
also indicators of substantial deadweight loss in the field of promoted busi-
ness start-ups. 
 
5.  The most-recent evaluation of publicly-sponsored job creation schemes (ABM) 
corroborated the evidence of delayed integration into employment in com-
parison to non-participants. Therefore, the employment opportunities of par-
ticipants are reduced. Negative effects were also found for the temporary 
work agencies for the unemployed (PSA) (COMPASS et al. 2005, WZB/Infas 
2006). 
 
6.  Post-completion effects on improved integration into employment have not 
yet been found for the Transfer Redundancy Compensation (Transferkurzar-
beitergeld, reformed in 2004) and the transfer measures. The negative effects on 
the employment opportunities of recipients, however, which were observed in 
the former redundancy compensation (Strukturkurzarbeitergeld), have since 
disappeared (IZA/DIW/Infas 2006). 
 
 
The evaluation studies suggest a vast deadweight loss, particularly in the fields of 
wage subsidies and promoted self-employment. This puts the positive effects of 
those measures found at the individual level into perspective, since recruitment and 
business start-ups that would also have taken place without subsidization are exten-
sively promoted. When it comes to wage subsidies and the promotion of self-
employment, the formation of suitable participant and control groups already poses 
problems, since almost all persons entitled to benefits claim them. In case of high 
deadweight loss, the assumption of conditional independence, one of the central as-
sumptions of matching, is violated. This complicates the determination of a causal 
effect and may lead to an overestimation of the integration effect (Eich-
horst/Schneider/Zimmermann 2006). The available macro-analyses (RWI/ISG 2006) 
do not yet offer clear findings in this respect.  
 
More generally speaking, the macro effects of active labor market policy schemes are 
not yet clear, as available macroeconomic studies do not show significant positive 
effects of active labor market policies on employment except for business start-up 
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grants (RWI/ISG 2006). Macro studies are thus more skeptical than micro studies and 
show no clear improvement of policy effectiveness after the reforms. Furthermore, 
the costs and benefits of active labor market policies have not yet been assessed. It is, 
therefore, unclear whether active labor market policies in Germany are efficient. 
Without knowing the “true” net effects of active labor market policies—taking into 
account deadweight loss and other side-effects, as well as the repercussions of taxa-
tion—the question whether the economy is better off with active labor market poli-
cies remains unanswered.  
 
In the “slipstream” of the Hartz evaluation, a formidable amount of money is still 
being used for measures that have not yet been evaluated. The packages of measures 
concerning the young and the disabled, which are quite large in terms of expenditure 
and numbers of participants, have still not been systematically examined for their 
effectiveness. An exception is the evaluation of the Special Preparatory Training Pro-
gram for Disadvantaged Youths (EQJ), which shows that participants have a greater 
chance of transcending into vocational training than the control group (Becker/Ekert 
2006). This evaluation result must, however, be viewed with due skepticism since the 
procedure chosen to construct the control group does not control for likely relevant 
selection mechanisms. Significant deadweight loss is also to be assumed. The effect of 
measures in decentralized free promotion is just as unclear. 
 
However, comprehensive studies of Social Code II (Hartz IV) may soon be available 
in order to reliably evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the integration benefits 
of employment opportunities, job-entry grants and other measures under §§16(2) 
Social Code II as well as the application of Social Code III instruments in this context. 
 
It has so far remained largely unsettled whether granting wage replacement benefits 
to avoid unemployment or to promote other jobseekers’ entry into employment satis-
fies these demands. The effects of early retirement have not yet been examined. There 
is, however, certain evidence that short-time work helps avoid layoffs, after all 
(Deeke 2005). 
 
Table 3 provides an overview of the integral components of the active labor market 
policy instruments currently used under Social Codes II and III. This list of over 60 
instruments surpasses the degree of detail with which the Federal Labor Agency 
categorizes its monthly and annual reports. It conveniently groups instruments to-
gether if they are thematically similar and target only slightly-different focus groups. 
The list, therefore, is shorter than the 80 instruments available under German labor 
market policy that are sometimes mentioned in public debate. Furthermore, Table 3 
shows how much of the intended integration effects of individual instruments have 
been empirically proven.  
 
 
TABLE 3 about here  
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3. 4 Assessment 
 
Since the evaluation of Hartz I through III, there are more evaluation studies using 
adequate methods for a larger number of instruments than in the past. Evidence of 
the positive and negative effects of individual measures can also be verified in more 
concrete ways. At the same time, a comparison of the evaluation studies from before 
and after the Hartz reforms shows that the effectiveness of some measures could be 
increased. On the whole, the evaluation process in the course of the Hartz reforms 
enabled a clearer distinction between effective and superfluous instruments. This 
should be recognized and appreciated as a distinct merit of recent German labor 
market policy. 
 
A comparison over time (Figure 1 and Table 4) shows that approximately 56 percent 
of expenditures in 2002 were allotted to measures for which effectiveness studies 
were present. Their reliability, though, was restrained by the then still-insufficient 
data basis. Positive effects were only to be assumed for six percent of expenditures 
(wage subsidies), while there were contradictory results for nearly 36 percent of ex-
penditures (promotion of further training and self-employment) and, with around 14 




FIGURE 1 about here 
 
 
TABLE 4 about here 
 
 
After the Hartz reforms and the most-recent evaluation reports, the share of 2006 
spending dedicated to evaluated measures decreased to 32 percent. That being said, 
additional expenses for the measures in Social Code II that have not yet been exam-
ined (25.6%) must be taken into account, for which evaluations are due (primarily 
job-entry grants, “one-euro jobs” and psycho-social services but also instruments 
stemming from Social Code III). Expenditures for instruments that had already been 
evaluated, such as job-creation schemes, further training or wage subsidies, were par-
ticularly on the decrease. But the degree of reliability and strength of current evalua-
tions have significantly improved. Consequently, approximately 28 percent of ex-
penses can now be regarded to have positive effects (sponsoring of further training 
and self-employment as well as wage subsidies and placement vouchers), while the 
share of measures to be assessed negatively has decreased to 1.5 percent (ABM, SAM 
and PSA). Unclear or neutral results occur for 1.9 percent of expenditures (transfer 
payments and commissioning third parties). Although big expenditure items such as 
measures for the disabled and the young (accounting for 16.3 and 11.2 percent, re-
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spectively) have still not been evaluated, the overall performance of labor market 
policy has largely increased in recent years. 
 
All in all, a mixed pattern emerges from the currently available evaluation studies: 
 
1.  Comparatively positive results are brought about by (i) wage subsidies (i.e. 
fixed-term payments to employers), (ii) measures of publicly sponsored fur-
ther training (especially if leading to a recognized vocational qualification), 
(iii) the promotion of self-employment and (iv) the placement voucher. 
 
2.  Job-creation schemes and similar instruments, but also temporary employ-
ment agencies for the unemployed, have negative effects on re-entry into em-
ployment. 
 
3.  Even in the case of the positively-assessed measures, the possibility of massive 
deadweight loss must be pointed out. This goes particularly for wage subsi-
dies and the promotion of self-employment. They partially foster employment 
that would have occurred either way. With regard to the measures of further 
training, it has not yet been unequivocally established how positive these ef-
fects will be in the long run. The evaluation period in the framework of the 
Hartz evaluation has been too short to draw any conclusions. 
 
4.  It must, however, be noted that presently, still only a part of all labor market 
policy measures in Germany have been evaluated using adequate methods, of 
which, in turn, only some of those measures that were subject to a robust im-
pact analysis can, with certain limitations, be assessed as positive. But even 
not employing instruments that were shown to have positive effects may lead 
to greater overall welfare if the negative effects caused by financing the im-
plementation of said instruments are too great. 
 
 
4. The Future of Active Labor Market Policy in Germany 
 
4.1 The Comprehensive and Obscure Array of Instruments Must Be Sorted Out 
 
The instruments of active labor market policy in Germany are still too complex and 
obscure. The reasons include the great level of detail in the Social Code III statutory 
prerequisites and the frequent changes to the measures brought about by legal 
changes or special labor market programs. This makes handling the instruments in 
practice just as difficult as evaluating, improving or sorting them out. The compre-
hensive and obscure catalog of measures could be shortened significantly without 
consequences for the effectiveness of German active labor market policy. There is 
much in favor of turning away from detailed statutory or administrative regulation 
and frequent legal modification. Social Code II, with its open phrasing geared toward 
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utility, is the more flexible and modern law. It could soon replace Social Code III. A 
bundle of broadly-defined measures that provide more scope to the actors to design 
precise programs would be a sufficient legal provision. The instruments may be fur-
ther improved through controlled experiments and strict performance reviews in a 
limited setting. The legal provisions for this already exist. 
 
Based upon the evaluation, it makes sense to primarily keep four instruments: 
 
1.  placement vouchers, 
 
2.  training programs, 
 
3.  wage subsidies and 
 
4.  business start-up grants. 
 
It is important, however, not to massively expand these relatively successful instru-
ments in the future, in order to avoid the creation of additional deadweight loss. In 
fact, efforts to reduce deadweight loss through regulations that serve as filters must 
be increased. For instance, the more positive effect of further training can partially be 
attributed to the more focused use of the instrument. Any measure lacking proven 
positive effects or even having negative effects on participants should be discontin-
ued. This applies to the temporary work agency for the unemployed, job-creation 
schemes and similar instruments. Waiting for further assessments seems practical 
with respect to measures whose effects have not been clarified yet. At the moment, it 
is evident that around 28 percent of expenditures or €4.2 billion cause positive effects. 
There are, however, some reservations concerning the integration effects because of 
the existing deadweight loss. 
 
4. 2 Continuing and Expanding Evaluation Efforts 
 
With the evaluation of Hartz I through III, there is a broad overview of the short- and 
long-term effects of the examined labor market policy instruments. The evaluation of 
the “classical” measures of labor market policy as well as of the instruments intro-
duced by the Hartz reforms yields a rather consistent pattern by now. It should be 
enhanced by studies that aim at evaluating the long-term effects of further training 
measures and the promotion of self-employment. 
 
On the whole, around 68 percent of current spending—or roughly €10 billion—has 
not (yet) been covered by evaluation studies. Approximately €3.8 billion of these ex-
penditures are associated with instruments of Social Code II, including job-entry 
grants, “one-euro jobs” and psycho-social services, as well as with measures bor-
rowed from Social Code III, which are still up for evaluation. 
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However, the integration effects of the measures for disadvantaged youth and the 
disabled, which are important in terms of participant numbers and associated ex-
penditures, are still unclear. After all, a total of €4.1 billion are spent annually on 
these measures. In the course of a comprehensive and systematic evaluation of labor 
market policy (using current scientific methods) the measures for the young and the 
disabled should also be subject to a first impact analysis. It is yet to be seen whether 
the measures achieve their goals or if they should be modified to improve their effec-
tiveness.  
 
Ultimately, the combined macro-economic effects of active labor market policy still 
await clarification. Present macro-studies do not yet offer the possibility to evaluate 
the net effects of labor market policy regarding deadweight loss, substitution and 
crowding-out and tax effects. 
 
4.3 Focused Implementation as a Catalyst for Effective Measure Design and Activa-
tion as a Necessary Supplement 
 
Active labor market policy features remarkable effectiveness and efficiency reserves, 
which could be utilized by better controlling the use of resources. First of all, this fo-
cuses on a target-oriented control of the respective service provider at the decentral-
ized level (i.e. the congruent responsibility for measure design, target-oriented com-
mitment of resources and its budgetary consequences) (Eich-
horst/Schneider/Zimmermann 2006). Here, private service providers can play an im-
portant role in practical realization. 
 
This also means that those actors who are concerned with the realization receive a 
greater scope of action with regard to target and budget responsibility, which applies 
particularly to the design of promising labor market policy measures. Achievement 
of objectives will be controlled through evaluation and monitoring. Effective and ef-
ficient measures will then succeed, while others will justifiably be abandoned. A cen-
tral, detailed definition of available instruments is thus unnecessary. It would suffice 
to define a scope of action, similar to free promotion or Social Code II, which allows 
for designing, combining, experimentally testing and evaluating measures according 
to usefulness, which may then be broadly implemented in the case of success. Pro-
gram evaluation within the PES is a useful step forward in this respect (Ste-
fan/Rässler/Schewe 2006).  
 
A “demanding” or “activating” labor market policy, which in practice connects the 
eligibility to transfer payments, Unemployment Benefit I or Unemployment Benefit 
II, to participation in active measures and an intensive job-search will probably have 
a much stronger impact on shortening the duration of unemployment than a primar-
ily “supportive” labor market policy. Suggestions of the effective impact of “de-
manding” interventions, like a more intensive monitoring of the job-search, more 
frequent contact with employment services or the use of job offers or labor market 
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policy measures to test availability as well as imposing or threatening sanctions, re-
sult from present foreign evaluation studies (Konle-Seidl 2005, Lalive/van 
Ours/Zweimüller 2000, Dolton/O’Neill 2002, van den Berg/van der Klauw/van Ours 
2004). In the course of the Hartz evaluation, substantial effects that fostered employ-
ment were found for the periods of benefit suspension in Social Code III (WZB/Infas 
2006). Increasingly activating recipients of basic support for job seekers should result 
in corresponding effects. Thus, activating recipients of transfer payments is a compa-
rably effective and cost-efficient expansion of active labor market policy measures. 
 
4.4 Opening the Labor Market rather than Special Segments 
 
When enhancing labor market policy, attention should be paid that no additional 
special segments of publicly-funded or -sponsored employment are created or exist-
ing segments expanded. Public employment opportunities are a good way to test 
availability to the labor market or to restore employability, but they should not be 
used as a permanent receptacle or “surrogate employment” for job-seekers who are 
not easy to place. The evaluation has clearly shown by now that job-creation schemes 
and similar instruments do not contribute to a speedy reintegration into the labor 
market but usually represent dead-end streets. In all probability, this will also apply 
to “one-euro jobs” and all forms of a “third labor market.” There are also only slight 
chances to transcend into regular employment from special segments like mini-jobs, 
especially since signs of crowding-out of employment subject to social security con-
tributions can be observed here (Fertig/Kluve 2006, RWI/ISG 2006). According to pre-
liminary results, this also applies to “one-euro jobs” (Kettner/Rebien 2007). In this 
context, other models of combined wages, which – if the level of basic support re-
mains unchanged – do not make much change in terms of employment policy but 
may induce large costs, are also problematic (Bonin/Schneider 2006). 
 
The chances for a transition to the regular, non-sponsored labor market are increas-
ing with an intensive activation of and care for job-seekers and a more flexible labor 
market where employment opportunities are also offered to the long-term unem-
ployed. The more open and absorbent the labor market and the more consequential 
the activation, the easier it will be for initially “hopeless” job-seekers to find entry 
into employment. Before this has been achieved in practice, no thought should be 
given to exceptions from the principle of reciprocity and the establishment of “pro-
tected” labor market segments. The examples of the positive effects of the liberaliza-
tion of temporary employment and mini jobs, which have been exempt from some 
duties and taxes, show that employment benefits from less regulation and a lower tax 
and duty burden (Fertig/Kluve 2006). Yet this should not remain restricted to certain 
segments but, rather, be extended to all of them. At the same time, new entry barriers 
like minimum wages or additional restrictive regulations should not be introduced. 
Opening the labor market without additional subsidies is a necessary supplement to 
an activating policy. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
Our survey of German labor market policies shows that only a small part of the com-
plex and opaque repertoire of active schemes effectively improves individual reem-
ployment probabilities. Hence, according to recent micro-econometric evaluation 
findings, only four instruments can be seen as helpful: (i) publicly sponsored train-
ing, (ii) start-up grants, (iii) wage subsidies, and (iv) placement vouchers. Yet, further 
evaluation is needed in order to assess the long-term effects of these schemes. At the 
same time, however, macro-econometric studies could hardly confirm the positive 
effect of active labor market policies and point at considerable deadweight loss, sub-
stitution effects and negative tax effects. Additional evaluation studies should not 
only address these macro issues and assess the overall efficiency of active schemes 
but also analyze the whole range of active labor market policy programs that have 
not been under scrutiny so far, in particular programs for disadvantaged youth and 
the disabled. With respect to the future setup of active labor market policy, our find-
ings point at the potential benefits of streamlining and shortening the list of instru-
ments with a focus on the most effective ones. In order to help select the most effec-
tive and efficient policy tools, practical implementation should be decentralized – 
also in terms of budget responsibility – and systematically monitored according to 
consistent and uniform objectives.  
  
It is of utmost importance for the future, however, to invest in education and further 
training, thus reducing the need for resources for active and passive labor market 
policies, which serve to compensate for deficits that have set in—be it by granting 
transfer payments, wage subsidies and combined wages or the promotion of further 
training for people who have become unemployed. A preventive policy must use 
education to see to it that low qualification upon taking up employment is avoided as 
much as possible and that employability remains in the later course of the working 
life through further training. At the same time, this means that low-wage employ-
ment cannot be sponsored, in order to avoid weakening individual incentives to in-
vest in education and to keep from withdrawing resources from the field of educa-
tion, which is so important for the future. 
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Table 1: Expenditures according to Type of Measure in Million Euros, 2002-2006 
  2006 2005 2004 2003 2002
 
Counseling and assistance with job-search  347 272 471 552  302
Placement voucher  102 61 75 47  14
Contracting third parties for placement services   89 101 180 351  174
Contracting providers of integration measures  26 17 24 12  
Support to counseling and placing  130 93 148 98  72
Payments to specialized integration services      44 44  42
 
Qualification   2,032 2,322 4,112 5,579  7,180
Sponsoring of further training ( = maintenance al-
lowance, costs of actual measures, unemployment 
benefits in case of further training)  1,702 1,985 3,616 5,001  6,702
Aptitude tests and training measures  330 337 496 578  478
 
Vocational guidance and promotion of vocational 
training/measures for youths  1,844 1,960 2,541 3,131  3,214
Vocational preparation schemes  365 414 433   
Vocational training for the disadvantaged (=support 
of disadvantaged trainees)  973 1,005 1,100 1,114  1,076
Training allowance because of vocational training  506 541 562 1,093  1,037
Immediate program for the young       446 924  1,101
 
Disabled people 
Benefits to enable disabled people to participate in 
working life, employment rehabilitation for the 
seriously disabled   2,572 2,850 3,235 3,296 3,101
 
Benefits on the job 
Promotion of dependent employment  968 850 1,704 1,996  1,795
Temporary work agencies for the unemployed  55 157 350 175  
Wage subsidies   608 454 908 1,349  1,225
Wage subsidies for start-ups  68 69 158 162  126
Wage subsidies in case of replacements  6 9 19 18  5
Remuneration guarantee for older workers  31 25 22 7  
Remuneration allowance for employees undergoing 
further training  14 18 20 16  4
Mobility grants  186 118 222 193  131
Employment support for the long-term unemployed       61  289
Reintegration into working life      5 15  15
 
Promotion of self-employment  2,645 3,222 2,726 1,413  1,006
Modified start-up grant  83  
Business start-up grant I (Bridging allowance)  1,471 1,847 1,746 1,145  1,006
Business start-up grant II (Me, Inc.)  1,027 1,353 980 268  
Job-entry grant according to §29 SGB II   64 22    
 
Employment-creating measures  2,040 1,900 1,660 2,334  3,168
Employment opportunities according to §16(3) SGB 
II  1,381 1,105   
Job-creation schemes  578 616 1212 1,676  2,333
Employment-creating infrastructural measures  12 12 49 60  25
Structural adjustment measures  69 167 399 598  810
 
Free promotion according to §10 SGB III  113 81 203 286  504
Other services according to §16(2) SGB II  441 196     
Other expenditures on integration listed in SGB II   34 282     
European Social Fund (ESF-BA program)  55 106 163 193  278
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  2006 2005 2004 2003 2002
TOTAL ACTIVE LABOR MARKET POLICY   13,093 14,041 16,815 18,780  20,548
 
Short-time work   150 416 637 687  604
Transfer redundancy payment and promotion of 
transfer measures  213 231 40   
Old-age part-time work (cases sponsored by the 
Federal Employment Agency)  1,271 1,111 986 864  674
Sponsoring of construction work in winter   253 241 216 272  245
TOTAL   14,978 16,040 18,694 20,603  22,071
Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2004a, 2005a, 2006a, 2007a, 2007b; figures for 2005 and 2006 include expenditures in the field 
of SGB II by the consortia of local and state labor agencies (BA 2006c). 
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Table 2: Participants in Active Labor Market Policy Schemes, 2000-2006 
  2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 
 
Counseling and Assistance 
with Job-search  
113,699 116,554 105,120 14,795       
Placement voucher, entrants  63,047  50,302    35,409       
Contracting third parties for 
placement services  
101,237  103,296  94,553      
Contracting providers of inte-
gration measures 
12,462 13,258 10,567 14,795      
Support to counselling and plac-
ing, entrants  
1,944,003 1,824,184 1,837,836 1,544,647 934,148  742,065  601,282 
 
Qualification  207,505 222,924 434,901 396,328 548,970 556,251 503,470 
Sponsoring of further training   119,513  114,350  184,418  250,976  331,586  344,816  324,274 
Qualification of the disabled      138,030   131,822 135,308 42,316 
Professional reintegration of 
disabled people 
27,105 34,021 43,091 45,425 38,922 41,941 27,695 
Aptitude tests and training 
measures 
60,887 69,000 94,748 77,887 61,950 51,266 47,492 
German  lessons      5,553  17,705 22,040 23,612 24,861 89,388 
 
Vocational guidance and 
promotion of vocational train-
ing/measures for youths 
305,344 305,819 316,653 334,503 238,339 221,586 182,702 
Vocational preparation 
schemes 
99,581 97,544 97,523 108,018  106,859  93,285 123,905 
Vocational training for the 
disadvantaged (=support of 
disadvantaged trainees) 
111,487 113,385 124,191 130,946 131,480 128,301 58,797 
Vocational training for the 
disabled  
94,276 94,890 94,939 95,539      
Training allowance because of 
vocational training 
90,568  100,330 107,821 102,659      
 
Benefits  on  the  job  408,685 415,479 398,472 280,994 209,222 187,861 175,070 
Promotion of dependent 
employment  
109,829 93,004  161,158 168,647 154,917 144,715 133,810 
Temporary work agencies for 
the unemployed 
8,251  16,833 27,784 10,749      
Wage subsidies   83,385  60,263  111,136 134,348 112,272 100,101 90,535 
Wage subsidies for start-ups  6,581  8,816  14,967 13,611 10,406 11,119 11,259 
Wage subsidies in case of 
replacements 
410 699 1,206  811 163    
Remuneration guarantee for 
older workers 
4,868 4,357 4,596        
Wage subsidy in case of con-
tinuous training  
1,288 1,345 1,469 883       
Mobility grants  261,357 211,996 303,531 292,356 177,331 141,981 106,081 
Job-entry grant according to 
§29 SGB II (dependent em-
ployment) 
5,046  691       
Employment support for the 
long-term unemployed 
     8,245  32,076  33,495  32,016 
Promotion of self-
employment 
298,856 322,473 237,276 112,347 54,305  43,146  41,260 
Modified start-up grant  7,208         
Business start-up grant I  63,370 82,993 83,730 72,081 54,305 43,146 41,260 
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  2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 
(Bridging allowance) 
Business start-up grant II (Me, 
Inc.) 
209,784 233,601 153,546 40,266       
Job-entry grant according to 
§29 SGB II (self-employment) 




344,520 287,010 223,137 222,747 278,354 327,250 390,018 
Employment opportunities 
according to §16(3) SGB II 
293,903  201,207       
Job-creation schemes  43,904 47,782 85,735 92,443 124,709  166,643  203,601 
Employment-creating infra-
structural measures 
597  965  1,785 1,296 373     
Structural adjustment meas-
ures for enterprises (East Ger-
many) 
   3,062  12,978  23,250  52,591 
Traditional structural adjust-
ment measures 
6,116  13,115 31,509 44,781 54,443 53,216 57,165 
Jobs for the long-term unem-
ployed   
    27,737 1,620       
Employment opportunities for 
recipients of unemployment 
assistance 
 23,941  12,493      
Immediate Program for the 
young (Jump plus)  
    25,572 3,945       
Immediate Program for the 
young 
    38,306 75,600 85,851 84,241 76,661 
 
Other  schemes    116,156  46,588 32,775 48,719 62,899 66,471 57,873 
Free promotion according to 
§10 SGB III 
25,541 23,618 32,775 48,719 62,899 66,471 57,873 
Other services according to 
§16(2) SGB II 
90,615  22,970       
European Social Fund (ESF-BA 
program) 
35,066 49,993 36,832 27,180 30,732    
 
TOTAL ACTIVE LABOR 
MARKET POLICY  
1,515,433 1,494,242 1,618,879 1,330,253      
 
Short-time  work      125,505 150,593 195,371 206,767 122,942 86,052 
Old-age part-time work (cases 
sponsored by the Federal 
Employment Agency) 
    79,632 69,673 61,440 50,323 33,412 
Source: Bundesanstalt für Arbeit 2001-2003; Bundesagentur für Arbeit 2004b, 2005b, 2006b, 2006d. 
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Table 3: Active Labor Market Schemes after the Hartz Reforms and Available Evaluation 
Findings
3  
Type of Measure 
 
Effects on Labor Market Integration 
Counseling and Job Search Assistance 
Placement voucher (§421g SGB III)  POSITIVE 
Integration is accelerated (WZB/Infas 
2006) 
Contracting third parties for placement services   
(§37 SGB III)  
NEUTRAL 
No effects found  
(WZB/Infas 2006) 
Contracting providers of integration measures (§421i 
SGB III) 
NEUTRAL  
No effects found  
(WZB/Infas 2006) 
Support to counseling and placement (§§45-46 SGB 
III) 
Not evaluated 
Qualification and Training  
Sponsoring of further training (§77 SGB III)   POSITIVE 
Higher chance of transition to em-
ployment after end of measure, long-
term evaluation not clear yet 
(IZA/DIW/Infas 2006) 
Wage subsidy in case of continuous training of em-
ployees without vocational training (§235c SGB III)  
Not evaluated 
Aptitude tests (§§48, 49(1) SGB III)  
Training measures (§§48, 49(2) SGB III) 
Cannot be evaluated due to short dura-
tion of measure and heterogeneous 
character 
Vocational guidance and promotion of vocational training/measures for youths 
Vocational training assistance – Promotion of voca-
tional training (§60 SGB III)  
Vocational training assistance – Occupation-specific 
educational programs (§61 SGB III)  
Employer subsidies for apprenticeship pay (§235 SGB 
III) 
Reimbursement of internship pay (§235b SGB III)  
Promotion of vocational training by grants to service 
providers (§§240 ff SGB III) 
In-work integration benefits through grants to service 
providers (§246a ff SGB III) 
Support of institutions for vocational training or voca-
tional rehabilitation (§248 ff SGB III) 
Support of residential centers for youth (§252 SGB III) 
Socio-educational assistance during preparatory voca-
tional training (§421m SGB III)  
Not evaluated in a systematic way 
Preparatory training (EQJ program)  No reliable evaluation  
Promotion of dependent employment  
Temporary work agencies for the unemployed (§37c 
SGB III)  
NEGATIVE 
Integration in regular employment is 
                                                 
3 Bold: Instruments that are currently available for new entrants; italics: instruments that were avail-
able in the beginning of 2006, but abolished later on.   
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Type of Measure 
 
Effects on Labor Market Integration 
impeded (WZB/Infas 2006) 
Wage subsidies in case of placement difficulties (§§217 
ff SGB III) 
POSITIVE  
Integration in regular, unsubsidized 
employment is facilitated, but signifi-
cant deadweight loss (ZEW/IAB/IAT 
2005) 
Wage subsidies for older workers (§421f SGB III)   NEUTRAL 
No effects, mainly deadweight loss  
(ZEW/IAB/IAT 2005) 
Wage subsidies for start-ups (§§225 ff SGB III)   Evaluated as a part of support for 
business start-ups  
Wage subsidies in case of replacements due to con-
tinuous training (§§229 ff SGB III) 
Not evaluated 
Remuneration guarantee for older workers (§421j SGB 
III) 
NEUTRAL 
No effects found 
(ZEW/IAB/IAT 2005) 
Exemption of employers from unemployment insur-
ance contribution in case of hiring older workers 
(§421k SGB III) 
NEUTRAL 
No effects found  
(ZEW/IAB/IAT 2005) 
Wage subsidies for employees enrolled in occupa-
tional training §417 SGB III) 
Not evaluated  
Mobility grants (§§53, 54 SGB III)   Not evaluated  
Job-entry grant according to §29 SGB II (dependent 
employment) 
Not evaluated so far (part of Social 
Code II) 
Measures for the disabled 
Wage subsidies for the disabled (§218(2) SGB III) 
Integration benefits for the severely disabled (§219 
SGB III) 
Apprenticeship subsidies for the disabled (§235a(1) 
SGB III)  
Integration benefits after completion of (further) train-
ing programs (§235a(3) SGB III) 
Probationary employment of the disabled (§238 SGB 
III) 
Direct job-creation for the disabled (§270a(1) SGB III)  
General benefits for the disabled: Mobility allowances 
(§§100, 101(1) SGB III) 
General benefits for the disabled: Occupational train-
ing (§§100, 101(2-5) SGB III) 
Special benefits for the disabled: Training allowances 
(§§102 -104 SGB III) 
Special benefits for the disabled: Bridging allowance 
(§§160 -162 SGB III) 
Special benefits for the disabled: Reimbursement of 
program participation fees (§109 SGB III) 
Not evaluated  
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Type of Measure 
 
Effects on Labor Market Integration 
Promotion of training for the disabled (S 236 SGB III) 
Work aids for the disabled (§237 SGB III)  
Subsidies for vocational centers for the disabled 
(§102(2) SGB III und §40 SGB IX) 
Miscellaneous labor market integration benefits for 
the disabled (§§33 ff SGB IX)  
 
Promotion of self-employment  
Start-up grant I (bridging allowance) (§57 SGB III, old ver-
sion, available until July 2006)  
Start-up grant II (Me, Inc.) (§421l SGB III, available until 
July 2006)  
POSITIVE  
Furthers exits from unemployment, but 
considerable deadweight loss; long-term 
effects unclear (IAB et al. 2006) 
Modified start-up grant (introduced in August 2006) 
(§57 SGB III, new version)  
Recently introduced, not evaluated yet  
Job-entry grant according to §29 SGB II (self-
employment) 
Not evaluated so far (part of Social 
Code II) 
Employment-creating measures  
Employment opportunities according to §16(3) SGB II 
– pay variant  
Employment opportunities according to §16(3) SGB II 
– additional pay variant  
Not evaluated so far (part of Social 
Code II) 
Direct job-creation schemes (ABM) basic support 
(§§260 ff SGB III)  
Direct job-creation schemes (ABM)  
intensified support (§266 SGB III)  
NEGATIVE 
Integration in regular employment is 
impeded (COMPASS et al. 2005) 




Free promotion according to §10 SGB III   Not evaluated in a systematic way, 
heterogenous cluster of instruments 
Other services according to §16(2) SGB II: child care 
and care for the elderly  
Other services according to §16(2) SGB II: debt coun-
seling 
Other services according to §16(2) SGB II: psychologi-
cal and social support 
Other services according to §16(2) SGB II: support in 
case of drug addiction  
Other supplementary services according to §16(2) SGB 
II  
Not evaluated so far (part of Social 
Code II) 
European Social Fund (ESF-BA program)  Heterogenous cluster of instruments, 
no clear findings  
Transfer payments to avoid unemployment  
Short-time work allowance (§§169 ff SGB III)  No systematic evaluation 
Winter bad weather benefits (§§214 SGB III, previous ver-
sion, abolished in 2006) 
Not evaluated   
Seasonal short-work benefits (replaced previous win-
ter bad weather benefits in April 2006, §175 SGB III, 
new version) in conjunction with additional winter 
benefits (§§209 ff SGB III) and employer reimburse-
Not evaluated so far  
  24 
Type of Measure 
 
Effects on Labor Market Integration 
ment of extra social costs (§175a SGB III)   
Transfer schemes (§216a SGB III) 
Transfer redundancy compensation (§216b SGB III) 
NEUTRAL 
No effects found  
(IZA/DIW/Infas 2006) 
Subsidized old-age part-time work (AltersTG)   Not evaluated 
Quelle: authors’ compilation. 
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Table 4: Expenditure and Evaluation, 2002 and 2006  
2002 2006   
Bill. €  % 
 
Bill. €  % 
Total expenditure on 
active labor market poli-
cies 
22.1  100.0  Total expenditure on ac-





9.7 43.7  Not  evaluated 
includes 
10.2 68.4 
Programs for the disabled  3.1  14.1  Programs for the disabled  2.4  16.3 
Programs for young unem-
ployed 
3.2  14.5  Programs for young unem-
ployed 
1.7 11.2 
Old-age part-time work  0.7  3.1  Old-age part-time work  1.3  8.4 
  Active schemes for the long-
term unemployed (Hartz IV) 
3.8 25.6 
 









Wage subsidies  1.4  6.1  Publicly funded training  1.3  11.4 
Start-up grant I (bridging 
allowance)  
1.5 9.8 
Start-up grant II (Me, Inc.)  1.0  6.9 
Wage subsidies  0.3  1.9 
 




3.2 14.4  Negative effects 
includes  
0.2 1.5 
Direct job creation  2.3  10.6  Direct job creation  0.1  0.7 
Structural adjustment 
schemes 
0.8  3.7  Structural adjustment sche-
mes 
0.1 0.5 
  Temporary agency work for 
the unemployed (PSA) 
0.04 0.3 
 
No or unclear effects 
includes 
7.9 35.7  No or unclear effects 
includes 
0.3 1.9 
Publicly funded training  6.7  30.4  Transfer measures   0.2  1.4 
Start-up grant (bridging 
allowance) 
1.0 4.6  Contracting-out  0.03 0.2 
Contracting-out 0.2  0.8   
Source: authors’ calculations. Note: expenditures within Social Code II were classified as not evaluated 
even if the instruments are borrowed from Social Code III.   
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Social Code II schemes
not evaluated
negative effects
neutral or unclear effects
positive effects
Source: Authors' calculation based on 
data from Bundesagentur für Arbeit.
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